“We arrived in Baghdad on May 1, 2003, the day President Bush, from the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, triumphantly declared the end of “major combat operations in Iraq.”

Detailing my experiences in human intelligence (HUMINT) in the first year of both wars, Collector unfolds as an increasingly somber chronicle of intelligence failure in the aftermath of 9/11.

Seen from the dual perspectives of HUMINT analysis (Afghanistan) and HUMINT collection (Iraq), the many limitations faced by both roles merged into grave intelligence uncertainties on the ground. Hobbled by poor planning, poor training, poor communications, virtually nonexistent top-level leadership, and a woeful lack of resources for HUMINT operations, the U.S. military's tactical-level intelligence apparatus inevitably proved unable to effectively combat each war’s growing insurgency.

Through source meets in downtown Baghdad, detainee interrogations near the Syrian border, late-night house raids in the heartland of the “Sunni Triangle,” and classified briefings within the U.S. military’s top command in Afghanistan, U.S. HUMINT’s overall dysfunction becomes painfully clear. Methodical and unsparing, Collector ultimately ends as a warning of the grinding war years to come.